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Comment
Pennsylvania Antitrust Law:
What is the Commonwealth's Policy
on Competition?
There is no antitrust statute in Pennsylvania.' One may question
whether there is any antitrust law in Pennsylvania. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania recently stated that the Sherman Act2 is an ap-
plication of the common law doctrine of restraint of trade to the field
of interstate commerce;' the next question, then, is whether the com-
mon law doctrines are sufficient to control unreasonable restraints of
trade in intrastate commerce. A parallel question is which of the
restrictive trade practices now considered to be under the Sherman
Act are contemplated in the Pennsylvania court's statement.
EDITOR's NOTE: Duquesne Law Review expresses its gratitude to Thomas Kerr, Ad-
junct Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law, and to the members of the
Allegheny County Bar Association Section on Antitrust for their help in the preparation
of this comment.
1. Pennsylvania and Vermont are the only states without statutory provisions pro-
hibiting contracts and combinations in restraint of trade. See generally [1981] 4 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 11 30,000-35,585.
2. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), in part provides:
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
3. "This Court has previously recognized that the Sherman Act... 'is merely an ap-
plication of the common-law doctrine concerning the restraint of trade to the field of in-
terstate commerce.'" Collins v. Main Line Bd. of Realtors, 452 Pa. 342, 349, 304 A.2d 493,
496 (quoting Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers' Union, Local 187, 339 Pa. 353,
359, 14 A.2d 438, 441 (1940)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
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The purpose of this comment is to discern the Commonwealth's
public policy with regard to the kind of conduct which federal courts
hold to violate the federal antitrust statutes. The federal laws reach
conduct which has a not insubstantial effect on interstate commerce. 4
Despite the wide reach of the federal statutes, there is room for state
antitrust enforcement:5 for example, where there is no impact on in-
terstate commerce; where the United States government, hampered by
limited resources, has to select which cases to investigate and pro-
secute; or where the activity has a particular effect on the state
government itself, as in price-fixing through bid-rigging for public con-
tracts.8
This comment will discuss Pennsylvania cases dealing with common
law restrictive trade practices such as price-fixing, tying agreements,
exclusive dealing, agreements not to compete, and monopolizing. It in-
cludes a glance at certain regulatory statutes to see what policy, if
any, with regard to competition is expressed by the Pennsylvania state
legislature. Finally, it provides a short description of Pennsylvania's
various trade and commerce statutes, and attempts to find some ex-
pression of a specific legislative policy.'
I. COMMON LAW RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
A. Horizontal Price-Fixing
Horizontal price-fixing can be described as an agreement among
competitors the purpose of which is to affect prices in an artifical man-
ner.' In federal courts it is considered a per se offense. Justice Black
defined per se offenses as follows:
4. The United States Supreme Court in McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232
(1980), re-emphasized that the reach of the Sherman Act corresponds to the reach of the
commerce clause, and held that there was a sufficient interstate effect in the financing of
residential property and in the insuring of titles to the property for an alleged price-fixing
conspiracy among local real estate brokers to meet the interstate component of Sherman
Act jurisdiction.
5. Where there are concurrent federal and state remedies for trade conduct it is im-
portant for the practitioner to be aware that a determination in either forum will be res
judicata in the other. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 49 U.S.L.W. 4687 (1981).
6. See Katz & Horwitz, The Need For A Legislative Antitrust Policy in Penn-
sylvania, 83 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1978); Note, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: The
Problems with Putting New Wine in Old Wine Skins, 4 J. CoaP. L. 547, 573, 579 (1979).
7. For a brief summary of case and statutory law, see ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS (1973-1974).
8. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the United States
Supreme Court said: "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and
with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodi-
ty in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." Id. at 223.
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[Tihere are certain agreements or practices which because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are con-
clusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use. . . . Among the practices which the courts have
heretofore decreed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price-fixing ....
division of markets.... group boycotts .... and tying arrangements ....
An early landmark Pennsylvania price-fixing case, decided two
decades before the 1890 enactment of the Sherman Act, is Morris Run
Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co.1" Five Pennsylvania coal companies had
agreed to divide the coal regions which they controlled and to sell only
at prices agreed upon. Any excess received by any of the companies was
to be shared amongst those who may have received less. The action was
brought for an amount due under this equalization plan. The agreement
had been made in New York and was found to be in violation of a New
York statute prohibiting conspiracies to commit acts injurious to, inter
alia, trade or commerce. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the
agreement also to be void at common law. The court made a strong
statement for Pennsylvania with regard to agreements such as this
where the parties obtain and exercise the power to control the market.
The court emphasized that it is the combination, the conspiracy, which
makes the contract injurious to the public:
They have combined together to govern the supply and the price of coal
in all the markets from the Hudson to the Mississippi rivers, and from
Pennsylvania to the lakes. This combination has a power in its con-
federated form which no individual action can confer. The public interest
must succumb to it, for it has left no competition free to correct its
baleful influence. When the supply of coal is suspended, the demand for it
becomes importunate, and prices must rise. Or if the supply goes forward,
the price fixed by the confederates must accompany it .... The influence
of a lack of supply or a rise in the price of an article of such prime
necessity, cannot be measured. It permeates the entire mass of communi-
ty, and leaves few of its members untouched by its withering blight. Such
a combination is more than a contract, it is an offence.... In all such com-
binations where the purpose is injurious or unlawful, the gist of the of-
fence is the conspiracy. . . . It is the effect of the act upon the public
which gives [this case] its evil aspect as the result of confederation; for
any baker might choose to hold up his own bread, or coal operator his
coal, rather than to sell at ruling prices; but when he destroys competition
by a combination with others, the public can buy of no one."
In reaching its conclusion that the agreement was illegal and void,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited as authority several early
9. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
10. 68 Pa. 173 (1871).
11. Id at 186-87.
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English and American cases on the doctrines of restrictive covenants12
and conspiracy.13 The case seems to be laying down new law for Penn-
sylvania in that the contracts or conspiracies cited are not on the scale
of the scheme which the coal operators devised. Perhaps the court was
deciding to make it clear to growing industries that unreasonable
restraints of trade are prohibited to large industries, such as these
Pennsylvania coal companies, as well as to the parties to a restrictive
covenant in an employment contract."
A second nineteenth century price-fixing case is Nester v. Continen-
tal Brewing Co.15 This was an action for an account and for payment of
money due from an unincorporated association of brewers to one of its
members. The brewers had agreed among themselves to control the
price of beer in the Philadelphia area. Despite the brewers' contention
that the restraint was only partial and thus not unlawful, the court in-
dicated that the test was not how broad or narrow the restraint, but
whether it was injurious to the public interest. A secret combination to
stifle competition and to enable the parties to control prices was void
as against public policy. The contract was illegal, and the court refused
to enforce it. It is interesting to note the language of the court in the
brewing company case, as it foretells the language and sense of the
Clayton Act."6
12. See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711) (enforcing because
reasonable a covenant not to compete incident to a contract for the sale of a bakery);
Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (1866) (finding void and against public policy a covenant not to
compete in any location during the lifetime of party).
13. See, e.g., Rex v. De Berenger, 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1814) (finding an illegal
conspiracy in the combination to raise public funds on a certain day by spreading false
rumors). (The case is erroneously cited by the Pennsylvania court as Rex v. De Beren-
quetal. 68 Pa. at 187.) See also Mifflin v. Commonwealth, 5 Watts & Serg. 461, 462 (Pa.
1843) (indictment for conspiracy to effect the elopement of a young girl because "there are
acts which, though innocent when done by an individual, are criminal when done in con-
cert").
14. See 68 Pa. at 185.
15. 161 Pa. 473, 29 A. 102 (1894).
16. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchan-
dise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented,
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or
the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or
rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the
lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such con-
dition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
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The test question, in every case like the present, is whether or not a
contract in restraint of trade exists which is injurious to the public in-
terests. If injurious, it is void as against public policy. Courts will not stop
to inquire as to the degree of injury inflicted. It is enough to know that
the natural tendency of such contracts is injurious.'
This seems to be a refinement of the view expressed in Morris Run
Coal, where the court had said:
An important principle stated in [the early English] cases is that as to
contracts for a limited restraint the courts start with a presumption that
they are illegal unless shown to have been made upon adequate considera-
tion, and upon circumstances both reasonable and useful.... The general
rule ... is that all restraints of trade, if nothing more appear, are bad....
Testing the present contracts by these principles, the restrictions laid
upon the production and price of coal cannot be sanctioned as reasonable
in view of their intimate relation to the public interests."
There is a development from the earlier concept of a presumption of il-
legality, rebuttable with a showing of reasonableness, towards the con-
cept that if the contract tends to bring injury to the public it is void,
and further inquiry into reasonableness is unnecessary.
These two early price-fixing cases seem to say that price-fixing is a
per se offense in Pennsylvania.'9 This assumption appears to underlie
the decisions in two later lower court cases, Philadelphia Cleaners &
Dyers Association v. Dollar Cleaners & Dyers, Inc." and Chapter No.
768, Associated Master Barbers v. Gambino." In Philadelphia Cleaners
the plaintiff, suing to enforce a price-fixing agreement between the
members of the association and two unions, argued that the minimum
price schedule was reasonable, that cleaning and dying was not a trade
but a service, and that the law against price-fixing was outmoded and
should be changed. To the reasonableness argument the court respond-
ed that to determine whether a price schedule was reasonable would
require a hearing and, thus, in effect, give the court the task of fixing
wages and profits. To the trade/service argument the court replied by
citing a recent United States Supreme Court decision2 holding that the
Sherman Act applied to the dry cleaning industry. As to the last argu-
ment, the court held that it was not up to the trial court to change the
law, and even if it were, price-fixing was injurious to the public, and,
17. 161 Pa. at 481, 29 A. at 104 (emphasis added).
18. Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 185-86 (1871).
19. Agreements whose purpose or effect is to control the prices in the marketplace
have been held to be unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 397-98 (1927). See note 8 supra.
20. 19 Pa. D. & C. 327 (1933).
21. 27 Northampton County Rep. 6 (1939).
22. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
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therefore, the common law doctrine against price-fixing should not be
changed.
Similarly, the agreements between barbers and a barbers' union set-
ting prices for barbering were held to be invalid in Gambino. The
union sued to compel a barber to charge the minimum price agreed to
in his union contract and argued the state's policy in favor of collective
bargaining. The court found no quarrel with the collective bargaining
agreement but refused to enforce the minimum price provision. "In the
absence of permissive legislation, we conclude that contracts tending
to limit competition and create monopolistic prices in favor of one
group to the detriment of the public remain against public policy and
are unenforceable."
This conclusion by a lower court was reinforced more recently by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Shuman v. Bernie's Drug Conces-
sions, Inc.24 "[The plaintiffs'] conduct constitutes an unprotected price-
fixing conspiracy in restraint of trade, illegal per se under section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act and unlawful at common law. ' 25 Horizontal
price-fixing, therefore, can be said to be against the law in Penn-
sylvania.
B. Vertical Price-Fixing
Vertical price-fixing occurs when manufacturers impose minimum or
maximum prices on their sellers; in other words when those higher up
in the chain of distribution attempt to control the market even though
they have moved their product into the flow of commerce. Vertical
price-fixing in interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act.28
It has a complicated history in Pennsylvania because of the fair trade
law" which was in force for a number of years pursuant to the Miller-
23. 27 Northampton County Rep. at 12.
24. 409 Pa. 539, 187 A.2d 660 (1963). See text accompanying note 31, infra.
25. 409 Pa. at 544, 187 A.2d at 663.
26. Vertical price fixing was condemned by the United States Supreme Court in Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). In Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme Court decided on a rule of
reason analysis for vertical territorial restrictions. "When anticompetitive effects are
shown to result from particular vertical restrictions they can be adequately policed under
the rule of reason, the standard traditionally applied for the majority of anticompetitive
practices challenged under § 1 of the Act." Id. at 59. Under the rule of reason the fact-
finder weighs all circumstances of the case to determine whether the practice in question
unreasonably restrains competition. Under the per se rule, certain practices are presumed
unreasonable without inquiry as to reasonableness or justification. Vertical price-fixing,
unlike vertical territorial restraints, still seems to be a per se violation. See id at 51 n.18.
27. Fair Trade Act, No. 115, 1935 Pa. Laws 266, as amended by Act of June 12, 1941,
No. 66, 1941 Pa. Laws 128 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 7 Purdon 1971) (repealed
1976) provided in part:
No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the
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Tydings Amendment and McGuire Act.' Under fair trade laws, resale
price maintenance was permitted between a manufacturer and
retailers of name brand products which were in fair and open competi-
tion with others of the same general class. There seems to have been a
judicial dislike of this law, however, and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court interpreted it very strictly. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mays,2 for ex-
ample, the court denied an injunction to a national gasoline distributor
seeking to prohibit a dealer from selling below the minimum prices set
by the oil company. The court remanded the case so that the company
could establish that its gasoline was of the same general class produc-
ed by others. The court explained why it would not automatically en-
force the oil company's fair trade claim:
It is important to bear in mind that absent the protective federal and
state legislation minimum resale price maintenance contracts will be
unenforceable as contrary to our basic anti-monopoly philosophy of unfet-
tered competition in the market of goods and services. Eminent
authorities are highly critical of this exempting legislation on the grounds
that it relieves distributors whose inventory consists largely of "fair
trade" products from the pressures and tribulations of price competition,
and in general facilitates price fixing efforts on the manufacturing and
distributive levels, contrary to the most elementary principles of a
dynamic free enterprise system.3
In addition to requiring strict compliance with the statute, the court
rendered ineffective any devices contrived to take advantage of the
statute. For example, in Shuman v. Bernie's Drug Concessions, Inc.,3
five retail drug store owners, in order to combat a cut-rate druggist
underselling them, requested certain manufacturers to sign fair trade
contracts with them. They then complained to the manufacturers about
the cut-rate druggist, but the manufacturers did nothing. The retailers
thereupon sued for an injunction to restrain the competitor from sel-
label or content of which bears, or the vending equipment from which said com-
modity is sold to a consumer bears the trademark, brand or the name of the pro-
ducer or owner of such commodity, and which is in fair and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced by others, shall be deemed a viola-
tion of any law of the State of Pennsylvania by reason of any of the following provi-
sions which may be contained in such contract:
(a) That the buyer will not resell such commodity, except at the price stipulated
by the vendor.
(b) That the buyer of such commodity require upon his resale of such commodity
that the purchaser from him agree that such purchaser will not in turn resell ex-
cept at the price stipulated by the vendor of the buyer.
28. The Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, tit. VIH, 50 Stat. 673 (1937) (repealed 1975);
McGuire Act, Pub. L. No. 82-542, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
29. 401 Pa. 413, 164 A.2d 656 (1960).
30. Id at 418-19, 164 A.2d at 659.
31. 409 Pa. 539. 187 A.2d 660 (1963).
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ling below the minimum price. The court saw this as a horizontal price-
fixing agreement which had nothing to do with the protection from
predatory price-cutting or with the protection of a trademark, which
were ostensibly the purposes of the fair trade laws.2 Presumably, with
the repeal of the Fair Trade Act, vertical price fixing has no raison
d'6tre and is once again, as one of the common law restraints of trade,
unlawful in Pennsylvania.
C. Restrictive Covenants
Restrictive covenants are generally found in employment contracts
or in contracts for the sale of a business. The promisor binds himself
not to engage in the same business as the employer or buyer within a
certain area for a certain period of time. The purpose of the agreement
is to protect the business of the promisee. The unlawful restraint of
trade occurs when the agreement is too extensive in time and space or
when, instead of being ancillary to another contract, it is itself essential-
ly a contract not to compete. To be lawful the contract must have a
main purpose to which the restrictive covenant is ancillary., This con-
cept is known as the "ancillary rule" and is followed in Pennsylvania. 4
The Pennsylvania courts, incidentally, have adopted the Restatement
of Contracts sections which prescribe the standards for determining
when contracts in restraint of trade are reasonable' and therefore
lawful.
32. 1& at 544, 187 A.2d at 663.
33. This doctrine was explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899) (an agreement between manufacturers of cast iron pipe to raise prices for
pipe in an area covering 75% of the nation was void at common law and under section 1
of the Sherman Act because it was in restraint of trade and tending toward monopoly,
despite the apparent reasonableness of the price).
34. Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, 465 Pa. 500, 351 A.2d 207 (1976).
35. Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra, 345 Pa. 464, 29 A.2d 64 (1942). RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 515 (1932) provides:
A restraint of trade is unreasonable, in the absence of statutory authorization or
dominant social or economic justification, if it
(a) is greater than is required for the protection of the person for whose benefit the
restraint is imposed, or
(b) imposes undue hardship upon the person restricted, or
(c) tends to create, or has for its purpose to create, a monopoly, or to control prices
or to limit production artificially, or
(d) unreasonably restricts the alienation or use of anything that is a subject of prop-
erty, or
(e) is based on a promise to refrain from competition and is not ancillary either to a
contract for the transfer of good-will or other subject of property or to an existing
employment or contract of employment.
In Pennsylvania Funds Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960), RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 516(f) (1932) was adopted. Section 516 provides:
738 Vol 19:731
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There are many Pennsylvania cases dealing with this type of agree-
ment. An early case is Keeler v. Taylor," concerning an agreement not
to compete embodied in an employment contract. The plaintiff had
agreed to instruct the defendant how to make platform scales and to
employ him for a daily wage. The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff
fifty dollars for every scale he sold to anyone else. After seven years'
employment, the defendant set up his own business; the plaintiff sued
for an accounting and for fifty dollars for every scale sold. The court
refused to uphold the contract because it found the contract contrary to
public policy and void, adding that were it not void, it would not be en-
forced at equity either, because it was prejudicial to the public.37
The covenant in a buy-sell agreement is apparently viewed with
less severity than one in an employment contract, as is seen in
Alabama Binder & Chemical Corp. v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Corp., a case involving both types of contract. A corporation purchased
the stock held by its fifty percent shareholder. Part of the buy-sell
agreement was an employment agreement, one of the provisions of
which restricted the seller from taking employment with any com-
petitor of the corporation for five years after termination of employ-
ment. The court treated this as a covenant not to compete ancillary to a
buy-sell agreement, not subject to a reasonableness test as stringent
as that applied to an employment contract, and upheld the agreement
as reasonable in time and space. 9
There is nothing unusual in Pennsylvania's law of covenants not to
compete: contracts in restraint of trade are unreasonable and will not
be enforced, unless they are ancillary to employment or buy-sell
agreements. They will be enforced where the purpose is to protect the
covenantee's business and where the restrictions are limited in time
and space.
D. Tying Arrangements
The United States Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement
as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on condition
The following bargains do not impose unreasonable restraint of trade unless ef-
fecting, or forming part of a plan to effect, a monopoly:
(fI A bargain by an assistant, servant, or agent not to compete with his employer,
or principal, during the term of the employment or agency, or thereafter, within
such territory and during such time as may be reasonably necessary for the protec-
tion of the employer or principal, without imposing undue hardship on the employee
or agent.
36. 53 Pa. 467 (1867).
37. IMt at 470.
38. 410 Pa. 214, 189 A.2d 180 (1963).
39. Id. at 219-20, 189 A.2d at 184.
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that the buyer also purchase a different (or tied) product, or at least
agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier.""0 These agreements are illegal under the Sherman Act and
under section 3 of the Clayton Act. 1 Although research has yielded no
tying cases in the Pennsylvania state courts, a case where one of the
counts was brought under Pennsylvania and common law has been
heard in federal court."2 Homeowners brought suit against mortgage
lenders who required the borrower to deposit every month with the
lender a sum equivalent to one-twelfth of the estimated annual local
property tax levy plus an amount equal to one-twelfth of the annual
fire insurance. These amounts were held by the lender until all taxes
and insurance premiums were paid; the lenders paid no interest on the
installment payments, nor did they make any allowance for them when
calculating the interest due on the unpaid principle. As all the local
lenders were alleged to follow this system and no mortgages could be
obtained without the borrower agreeing to this arrangement, the plain-
tiffs asserted conspiracy and tying under the Sherman Act. They also
asserted a pendent claim under the common law of restraints of trade.
The defendants moved to dismiss the latter on the grounds that there
was no such cause of action under Pennsylvania law. The court
disagreed, citing the statement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
that the Sherman Act was merely an application of the common law
doctrine of restraints of trade to the area of interstate commerce. 3
The court found that the operative facts, the rights allegedly violated,
and the theories of relief were identical for both the Sherman Act and
the common law restraint of trade counts. One may question whether
the plaintiffs would have had a cause of action had they brought suit in
the state courts under the counts of conspiracy and tying. The answer
depends on whether the court's statement in Collins concerning the
Sherman Act is simply dictum or an affirmative statement of the law.
4
40. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
41. See notes 2 and 16 supra. See also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38
(1962); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
42. Beck v. Athens Building Loan and Savings Ass'n, 65 F.R.D. 691 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
43. See note 3 supra.
44. See, e.g., Note, Collins v. Main Line Board of Realtors: "Open Door" Policy for
Real Estate Multiple Listing Services, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 323 (1973). The suggestion is
made that the language and conclusions in Collins would apparently allow a plaintiff alleg-
ing an unreasonable restraint of trade to bring suit under the common law. He would then
argue the case under the federal decisions. The effect might be that Pennsylvania would
have a judicially created "little Sherman Act" which would provide a remedy for the
business person injured by unreasonable restraints of trade. Id. at 332-34.
A contradictory point of view was expressed in Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization..
Vol 19:731
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A statute that expressly prohibited tying agreements would eliminate
this uncertainty.
E. Exclusive Dealing
When a buyer agrees not to use or deal in the goods of the com-
petitors of his seller, the agreement is an exclusive dealing contract.
Such contracts can be attacked under the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act.45 In Pennsylvania the state of the law as to exclusive deal-
ing is not clear, but there are a few cases which uphold this type of
agreement.
The earliest Pennsylvania case is Delaware and Hudson Canal Co. v.
Pennsylvania Coal Co."' The case involved a suit to cancel a contract
whereby the canal company was bound to furnish the use of its canal
to the coal company in return for a toll calculated on the basis of the
price at which the coal was sold. The contract was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. A few years later, by special act of
the legislature, the attorney general was directed to bring both parties
before the court to investigate whether the agreement was in excess
of their corporate powers. 47 One of the objections to the contract was
that the canal company was bound to keep half of the capacity of the
canal for the exclusive use of the coal company. Because there was no
evidence of injury to the public, the court found no fault with the con-
tract.4 8
A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 375 (1974).
[S]ome state courts [including the Collins court] announce that their common law
embraces the principles that have been developed under the Sherman Act....
Even if this sort of statement may be taken at face value, as seems highly dubious,
it is, of course, far from any reflection of what state law would have become even
in such states without the impetus provided by federal legislation and decisions.
Id. at 431 n.214.
45. Under federal law, exclusive dealing arrangements can be attacked under section
1 of the Sherman Act and more specifically under section 3 of the Clayton act. See note
16 supra. "In practical application [of section 3], even though a contract is found to be an
exclusive dealing arrangment, it does not violate the section unless the court believes it
probable that performance of the contract will foreclose competition in a substantial share
of the line of commerce affected." Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327
(1961). But see section 2-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code codified at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12A, § 2-306 (Purdon 1970) (repealed and republished as 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2306 (1979)) and Pennsylvania Bar Association Notes thereunder, stating that requirement
and output contracts are enforceable in Pennsylvania.
46. 21 Pa. 131 (1853).
47. Commonwealth v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 43 Pa. 295 (1862).
48. Id. at 302.
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Other cases upholding exclusive dealing include Bald Eagle Valley
Railroad v. Nittany Valley Railroad9 where the court issued an injunc-
tion restraining the defendant from shipping iron ore from his furnace
on any railroad other than the plaintiffs, as he had agreed by contract.
In Arons v. Kopf 5 an agreement between a supplier and a retailer that
the supplier not sell through any other retailer in town was upheld.
The court found that it was not against public policy, that rather than
a public injury, such an agreement giving one dealer exclusive control
of a line of goods could be a community convenience. 51 Similarly, a con-
tract of a manufacturer of spray paint, giving a distributor exclusive
world-wide rights to distribute the paint, was held not unlawful.52 From
these cases, the most that can be said is that exclusive dealing is not
forbidden in Pennsylvania without a showing of injury to the public.
Once again, a statute providing specific guidance would tell Penn-
sylvania lawyers and businessmen exactly what they may not do,
rather than leaving them in the imprecise world of common law doc-
trines which may or may not be the law in Pennsylvania.
F. Monopoly and Monopolizing
Monopoly is unlawful, at least where it involves an intent to control
the market and to exclude competitors. It is specifically prohibited by
section 2 of Sherman Act, although the precise nature of the violation
is not defined. The courts have struggled with the tests to be used for
finding a violation, as is shown in Judge Wyzanski's opinion in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.'
In analyzing monopolization, the basic inquiries are two:
(1) how much market power is necessary to constitute "monopoly power";
and (2) what additional element, if any, of conduct or "intent" is necessary
to establish the monopolization offense. The related subsidiary questions
are these: (3) If § 2 requires more than monopoly power, what kinds of
conduct or intent transform monopoly into unlawful monopolization; and
(4) what defenses, if any, save monopoly power from condemnation.4
It is not within the scope of this comment to analyze monopolization
beyond the point of emphasizing that it is an area of great complexity
which has evolved considerably in the last century.5 It is a part of the
49. 171 Pa. 284, 33 A. 239 (1895).
50. 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 123 (1902).
51. Id at 125-26.
52. Maxwell v. Schaefer, 381 Pa. 13, 112 A.2d 69 (1955).
53. 110 F. Supp. 295, 341-46 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
54. H P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrTRUST LAW 600 (1978).
55. See Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945). See also Levi, The Antitrust Law and Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1947).
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common law tradition, although that tradition itself has been subject
to a certain flux and flow. 6 And it is an area which seems to call for a
statute. In Pennsylvania the cases do not give any guidance: Morris
Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co.57 speaks strongly against monopolistic
practices, basing its decision on the common law doctrines, but there
are later cases startling in their contradiction of the view expressed
in Morris Run Coal. In Monongahela River Consolidated Coal and Coke
Co. v. Jutte58 the plaintiff corporation had bought nearly all the coal
mines along the Monongahela River. He acquired most of the boats and
most of the coal landings. As a result, he shipped eighty-five to ninety
percent of all coal shipped by river out of the Monongahela valley. The
defendant organized a corporation to mine and ship coal along the
Monongahela, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers, despite a contract with the
plaintiff that he would not mine or ship coal on the three rivers for ten
years except in conjunction with the plaintiff. The lower court issued
an injunction against the defendant. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed as to the intrastate activity but it stated that because of the
Sherman Act it could not enjoin the mining and marketing of coal out-
side Pennsylvania. The policies of the Sherman Act apparently had no
impact on the court's perception of restrictive covenants. The decision
provides further evidence of the need for a Pennsylvania statute ex-
pressing the state's policy without equivocation.
The Jutte case was followed a few years later in Harbison-Walker
Refractories Co. v. Stanton.9 In connection with a buy-sell agreement,
the defendant agreed not to manufacture, buy, sell, or deal in silica
brick or clay fire brick in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, New Jersey,
Maryland, or Ohio for fifteen years without the plaintiffs consent. The
plaintiff's purchase of the defendant's business brought about a con-
solidation of Pennsylvania fire brick companies and gave the plaintiff
control of sixty to seventy percent of this type of brick sold in Penn-
sylvania and elsewhere. Incidentally, the prices of brick rose ten per-
cent after the acquisition. If this were within the reach of the Sherman
Act, there would be a question about the monopoly power-i.e., the
power to exclude competition or to contrdl prices-being wrongfully
wielded by these companies. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
however, saw no monopolizing and no illegal restraint of trade, but
rather a legitimate business transaction to which the restraint was in-
cidental. In its rationale, the court distinguished between legitimate
56. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
355 (1954).
57. 68 Pa. 173 (1871).
58. 210 Pa. 288, 59 A. 1088 (1904).
59. 227 Pa. 55, 75 A. 988 (1910).
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business transactions and combinations to stifle competition and ar-
bitrarily increase prices."
Both these cases concern restrictive covenants. They are mentioned
in this section because the court in each case discussed, however brief-
ly, the question of monopolizing. There are no cases where the plaintiff
is a competitor being put out of business by the defendant's predatory
monopolistic behavior. In each Pennsylvania case mentioned above the
defendant breached a contract with the plaintiff and attempted to
justify the breach by pleading the illegality of the contract. If there
were a statute specifically forbidding monopolies, as there is in almost
every other state, there would be more consistency and predictability
as to what is lawful, and lawyers and businessmen would no longer
have to depend on decisions rendered in cases brought against dis-
gruntled contract breachers.
An interesting perception of the Sherman Act is presented in a law
review article analyzing the historical development of the common law
of monopoly:
[T]he Sherman Act went far beyond the common law where it authorized
injured persons to sue, and the Attorney General to indict violators of the
Act, making it possible to enforce competition actively. The Act was
therefore much more an innovation than its authors realized. It did not, as
they thought, merely declare the common law. It can almost be said to
have helped create the common law, insofar as its authors' convictions
helped spread the belief that the common law always expressed as much
antagonism to monopoly as they wrote into the Sherman Act. 1
In view of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's description of the
Sherman Act as merely the common law applied to interstate com-
merce, the question arises again: what common law? Darcy v. Allein
(the Case of Monopolies) 2 has been described as the greatest single
step in creating the modern common law on monopolies.' But there is
60. The court said:
There should be and is a distinction between a consolidation of properties by pur-
chase for legitimate business reasons in order to increase production and reduce
cost, and a combination of owners and properties under one management which in
many instances stifles competition and arbitrarily increases prices. As we read the
cases construing the anti-trust statute the rule established seems to be that it has
no application where the contract sought to be declared illegal concerns a
legitimate business transaction and the unlawful restraint complained of is only in-
cidental or collateral.
Id. at 63, 75 A. at 990. See also City Ice Co. v. Easton Merchants Ice Co., 267 Pa. 500, 110
A. 350 (1920).
61. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHi. L. REv.
355, 385 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Letwin].
62. 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1603).
63. Letwin, supra note 61, at 363.
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a question whether a case holding void a monopoly of the importation
of playing cards into seventeenth century England is adequate to deal
with schemes that twentieth century businessmen can devise.
A significant, oft-cited, more recent case is Schwartz v. Laundry &
Linen Supply Drivers' Union," involving a labor contract between
laundry companies and the union. The companies agreed not to accept
work from independent operators known as "bobtails," who were both
competitors and customers of the companies in that they solicited
business independently, but also contracted .with the companies for
laundry service. Only those bobtails already under contract would be
dealt with. There were other restrictive provisions in effect cutting
out business from the bobtails, who were a threat to the companies
because they charged lower prices. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
invalidated the contract for various restraints of trade including illegal
allocation of customers, attempting to keep newcomers to the field out
of business, and price-fixing. The court held the contract in violation
of the "common-law prohibition of monopolies and unreasonable
restraints of trade. '6 5 Although the court cited certain Pennyslvania
restraint of trade cases,6 it did not cite either Morris Run Coal or
Jutte. In Jutte the court had said that it doubted that the older ruling
of Morris Run Coal would stand and asserted the public policy of Penn-
sylvania to be that of encouraging and promoting large aggregation of
corporate capital for the development of all the Commonwealth's
resources. 7 Perhaps the Schwartz court decided to avoid the embar-
rassment of switching positions by ignoring both cases and basing its
64. 339 Pa. 353, 14 A.2d 438 (1940).
65. Id- at 362, 14 A.2d at 442.
66. Philadelphia Cleaners & Dyers Ass'n v. Dollar Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 19 Pa. D.
& C. 327 (1933); Chapter No. 768, Associated Master Barbers v. Gambino, 27 Northampton
County Rep. 6 (1939); Ford Motor Co. v. Quinn, 70 Pa. Super. Ct. 337 (1918).
67. The Court said:
As we understand the public policy of this Commonwealth, both as disclosed in the
constitution of 1874 and as apparent in all the legislation since, it is to encourage
and promote large aggregations of corporate capital for the development of all the
commonwealth's resources.
The last case in this state distinctly following the older rulings, is Morris Run
Coal Co .... That case held to the principle that all restraints on trade are in-
jurious to the public, and, therefore, presumably illegal and void on the ground of
public policy.... While we have no doubt as to the soundness of the general princi-
ple laid down in that case, we doubt if today the court would hold on the particular
facts developed, that the principle was applicable to those facts.
We think that perhaps at this day we would go further, and inquire whether in
view of the purpose of the contract and the slight restraint it imposed on trade, it
was unreasonable and therefore void, and not void solely because it to a certain ex-
tent monopolized the production of coal.
210 Pa. at 299-300, 59 A. at 1092.
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decision on the new Sherman Act cases instead. 8 Although the case is
not a monopolizing case, it seems to follow the fundamental abhorrence
of anticompetitive monopolistic behavior expressed in Morris Run and
the subsequent cases which most clearly express a free market policy
in Pennsylvania.
G. Price Discrimination and Predatory Pricing
Price discrimination occurs when a seller charges different com-
peting reselling buyers different prices for the same merchandise. It is
prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,69 the purpose of which
was essentially to prevent unscrupulous suppliers from attempting to
gain an unfair advantage over their competitors by discriminating
among buyers, and to prevent large volume buyers from using their
economic leverage to exact discriminatory prices from suppliers to the
disadvantage of less powerful buyers. 0
There is no such statute in Pennsylvania. Arguably, because price
discrimination is a statutory offense, and Pennsylvania follows merely
the common law tradition of restrictive trade practices, there is no
cause of action in Pennsylvania for discriminatory pricing.
However, section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act 71 prohibits
predatory pricing, a type of conduct arguably also proscribed by sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. 2 The question becomes whether predatory
pricing, if not coupled with price discrimination, is a common law of-
fense. If it is, then predatory pricing arguably is against the law in
Pennsylvania. Most of the cases where the Pennsylvania courts discuss
predatory pricing are fair trade cases where the court explains that
one of the reasons for fair trade laws was the prevention of predatory
pricing.73 This impliedly assumes that predatory pricing is unlawful.
But even if predatory pricing is not presumptively unlawful, the Penn-
68. Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); In-
terstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc.
v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932). See also note 44 supra.
69. The Robinson Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 to 13b, 21a (1976). See Great AtI. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S.
685 (1967); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
70. E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 61 (2d ed. 1973).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful ... to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the United
States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United
States for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in
such part of the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably
low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
72. I1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 711 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Master, 408 Pa. 202, 182 A.2d 734 (1962).
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sylvania Unfair Sales Act 4 reaches the more blatant instances, as it
prohibits sales below cost where the seller's intent is to injure a com-
petitor or lessen competition. It is perhaps not incorrect to suggest
that there is a similarity between the little-used section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act, which subjects those engaged in malicious be-
low-cost pricing to criminal penalties, and Pennsylvania's Unfair Sales
Act, which makes a violation of the Act a misdemeanor subject to
criminal penalties.
H. Other Restrictive Trade Practices
With regard to mergers, there is no statutory prohibition in Penn-
sylvania;75 under federal law, mergers are controlled by section 7 of the
Clayton Act 78 and by the Sherman Act. In order to challenge a merger
in intrastate activity, one would need to use as authority the anti-
monopoly language of such cases as Morris Run Coal, 7 Jutte,'78 and
Schwartz. 9 Similarly, as to interlocking directorates, which are subject
to section 8 of the Clayton Act," the only prohibition in Pennsylvania
is for insurance companies: section 337.2 of the Insurance Company
Law of 192181 restricts interlocking directorates where there is a risk
of monopoly or of substantially lessening competition. Otherwise, there
is only the fiduciary duty82 of corporate officers and directors as a
restriction on misfeasance due to interlocking directorships.'
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 211-217 (Purdon 1971). Section 213 provides:
It is hereby declared that advertisement, offer to sell or sale of any merchandise,
either by retailers or wholesalers, at less than cost as defined in this act with the
intent of unfairly diverting trade from or otherwise injuring a competitor or with
the result of deceiving any purchaser or prospective purchaser, substantially
lessening competition, unreasonably restraining trade or tending to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce is an unfair method of competition contrary to
public policy and in contravention of the policy of this act.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1901 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1981-1982) authorizes the
merger of any two or more business corporations.
76. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (1973 & Supp. 1980). See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. E.. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
77. See note 10 supra.
78. See note 58 supra.
79. See note 64 supra.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 459.2 (Purdon 1971).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
83. Bowman v. Gum, Inc., 327 Pa. 403, 193 A. 271 (1937); Evans v. Armour & Co., 241
F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa. 1965). See also Ward, Some Notes on Transactions Involving In-
terested and Interlocking Directors in Pennyslvania, 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 107 (1949) (trans-
actions between corporations with interlocking directors are not void but merely voidable,




The Collins case tells the Pennsylvania lawyer that the Sherman
Act is a codification of the common law." The cases in the Penn-
sylvania courts tell us, in general, that certain restraints of trade are
illegal. Price-fixing (horizontal and vertical), market allocation,
customer allocation, 5 and monopoly are unlawful according to Morris
Run Coal and Schwartz. Group boycotts and refusals to deal are
arguably forbidden by Schwartz. There is also language in Jutte con-
demning monopoly. Tying, exclusive dealing, mergers, and interlocking
directorates may or may not be illegal in Pennsylvania.
There is policy to be extracted from these cases, but the lawyer can
probably find cases expressing whichever policy he chooses. It is not
clear whether Pennsylvania is a strong pro-competition state. Certainly
some judges have thought so. If one builds on the premise that price-
fixing is consistently held to be illegal and that monopoly and
unreasonable restraints of trade are said to be against public policy, it
is arguable that there is a fundamental free competition policy in Penn-
sylvania. But without a statute making this unequivocally clear, there
will be cases such as Jutte saying that, depending on the method
chosen, competition may be lawfully hampered. 6
One can argue that because Pennsylvania is a highly industrial state
it should have, as do other such states, an antitrust statute, though the
great industries in Pennyslvania are probably, by virtue of their na-
tional and multi-national character, comfortably within the purview of
the federal statutes. It would be the smaller, particularly local,
businesses which can escape the Sherman Act, but whose restrictive
practices might well raise the cost of living for the residents of the
Commonwealth, that would be the targets of a state statute. There is a
need for antitrust enforcement power in Pennsylvania giving ability to
the attorney general and private parties to move against local
restraints of trade. 7 The need, specifically, is for legislation and for
adequate funding to implement it.
84. See note 3 supra.
85. Horizontal market division agreements are usually treated similarly to price-
fixing agreements under the Sherman Act. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405
U.S. 596 (1972). This practice involves agreements among competitors dividing a product
or geographic market.
86. Monongahela River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Jutte, 210 Pa. 288, 300, 59 A.
1088, 1092 (1904).
87. Katz & Horwitz, The Need For A Legislative Antitrust Policy in Pennsylvania,
83 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1978). See also Fellmeth, Public Prosecution of Local Antitrust
Violators: A Survey of State Laws, [1975] 4 CLASS ACTION REP. 365.
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II. REGULATED INDUSTRIES
In order to ascertain whether there is any implicit or explicit
legislative antitrust policy in Pennsylvania, a survey has been made of
certain statutes governing regulated industries. This comment does
not claim to be exhaustive. The scope is limited to statutes, arbitrarily
selected, which touch on certain significant parts of intrastate commer-
cial activity.
At the federal level, the regulated industries are deemed to be
exempt, at least to some extent, from antitrust legislation." The
regulatory statutes substitute other controls and regulations for the
antitrust laws, and as a result there is a separation of regulatory
policy and antitrust policy according to the determinations made for
the particular industry by the legislature.89 Some federal regulatory
statutes have provisions requiring the agency to give consideration to
possible anti-competitive effects;M the Clayton Act gives some agencies
the authority to enforce certain sections of the Act;9' alternatively, the
courts themselves will look at the anti-competitive behavior of an in-
dustry.92
A defendant may argue that a federal regulatory statute has im-
pliedly repealed the Sherman Act with respect to his industry. Where
Congress intended to repeal the antitrust laws, that intent governs. 3
But even substantial regulation does not in itself imply intent to repeal
the antitrust laws. The United States Supreme Court recently held, in
88. But see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), where the
United States Supreme Court said that a power company was not immune from antitrust
prosecution despite the regulation of the interstate distribution of power by the Federal
Power Commission. See generally I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 221-230
(1978); 3 H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES IN-
CLUDING ALL RELATED TRADE REGULATORY LAWS (1949 & Supp. 1980).
89. Professors Areeda and Turner have explained this dichotomy thus:
Competition enforced by the antitrust laws is sometimes thought impossible or inap-
propriate. Accordingly, special statutes have been enacted to modify, complement,
or displace the competitive premises and rules of the antitrust laws. The normal
antitrust standard may be expressly modified in relatively limited particulars....
Or the antitrust laws may be substantially displaced in varying degrees.... Or an
industry may be subjected to direct and continuing regulation by an administrative
agency whose jurisdiction affects the application of the antitrust laws in diverse
and complex ways.
I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 221, at 133 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
90. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, § 313, 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1976) (Federal Com-
munications Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (Supp. II 1979) (Civil Aeronautics Board).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
92. See, e.g., Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973); Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
93. United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 710-20 (1975).
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National Gerimedical Hospital v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,94 that the
Blue Cross Association, implementing health plans under the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act (NHPRDA),5 was not
immune from the antitrust laws. The plaintiff filed suit under the Sher-
man Act alleging refusal to deal and conspiracy. The court analyzed
the purpose of the NHPRDA and reviewed its own decisions in the
area of implied repeals of antitrust laws. The court reiterated the rule
that antitrust immunity can be implied only where there is a clear
repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory systems. 6
In this case not only was there no such conflict, but the anti-
competitive action taken by Blue Cross was neither compelled nor ap-
proved by the regulatory body and, furthermore, there was no reason
to believe that Congress intended to immunize the health care in-
dustry's private conduct from the antitrust laws under the NHPRDA.Y
This case is a further reminder to practitioners that immunity from
the antitrust laws must be clearly indicated by Congress, in a
regulatory statute, before anti-competitive behavior in the regulated
industry will be permitted.
A. Banking
The banking industry had thought that banking was exempt from
the antitrust laws. But in two cases the United States Supreme Court
disabused bankers of that illusion, finding the consolidation of the
banks in question to be violations of the Clayton Act and the Sherman
Act.98 Much banking activity has interstate ramifications, thus bringing
itself within the purview of the federal antitrust laws. However, bank-
ing is subject to considerable state regulation, and purely local banking
conceivably could be considered merely intrastate activity, or else be
of insufficient significance for the federal government to choose to pur-
sue it.9 In Pennsylvania, banks are regulated by the Banking Code of
94. 49 U.S.L.W. 4673 (1981).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 3001 (1976).
96. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4675. Accord, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973).
97. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4675.
98, United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964) (merger a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963) (merger a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act; citing cases to the ef-
fect that repeal of the antitrust laws by implication from regulatory statutes is strongly
disfavored).
99. See Katz & Horwitz, The Need For A Legislative Antitrust Policy in Penn-
sylvania, 83 DICK. L. REV. 1, 13 (1978); Note, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: The
Problems With Putting New Wine In Old Wine Skins, 4 J. CORP. L. 547, 573 (1979).
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1965.1" The declared purpose of the statute is to provide, inter alia, for
banks to be competitive with each other and with other financial in-
stitutions.'' The comment to the Banking Code by the Banking Law
Commission explains the basic premise to be that banks must be able
to meet competition."o2 This is protective language rather than com-
petitive. Competition in the antitrust sense appears to be con-
templated only in the section on mergers, where there is an instruction
to consider the effects of a merger on competition.0 3 The Banking Law
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 101-2204 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1980). See also Savings
Association Code of 1967, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 6020-1 to -254 (Supp. 1980).
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 103(a) (Purdon 1967) provides that the purposes of the Act
are:
(i) The safe and sound conduct of the business of institutions subject to this act,
(ii) The conservation of their assets,
(iii) The maintenance of public confidence in them,
(iv) The protection of the interests of their depositors, creditors and shareholders
and the interests of the public in the soundness and preservation of the banking
system,
(v) The opportunity for institutions subject to this act to remain competitive with
each other, with financial organizations existing under other laws of this Com-
monwealth, and with banking and financial organizations existing under the laws of
other states, the United States and foreign countries,
(vi) The opportunity for institutions subject to this act to serve effectively the
convenience and needs of their depositors, borrowers and other customers, to par-
ticipate in and promote the economic progress of Pennsylvania and the United
States and to improve and expand their services and facilities for those purposes,
(vii) The opportunity for the management of institutions to exercise their
business judgment, subject to the provisions of this act, in conducting the affairs of
their institutions, to the extent compatible with, and subject to, the purposes
recited in the preceding clauses of this subsection (a),
(viii) A delegation to the department of adequate rulemaking power and ad-
ministrative discretion, subject to the provisions of this act and to the purposes
stated in this subsection (a), in order that the supervision and regulation of institu-
tions subject to this act may be flexible and readily responsive to changes in
economic conditions and to changes in banking and fiduciary practices, and
(ix) Simplifications and modernization of the law governing banking and govern-
ing the exercise of fiduciary and other representative powers by corporations.
102. See id Comment-Banking Law Commission.
103. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1604 (Purdon 1967) provides in relevant part:
(a) Upon receipt of an application for approval of a merger or consolidation and of
the supporting items required by subsection 1603(e), the department shall conduct
such investigation as it may deem necessary to ascertain whether:
(iv) The merger or consolidation would be consistent with adequate
and sound banking and in the public interest on the basis of
(D) The potential effect of the merger or consolidation on com-
petition.
See also a parallel section directed to the merger of savings associations at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 1609(e)(i)(E)(4) (Supp. 1979).
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Commission's comment"4 to this section explains that the competitive
test, new in 1965, is similar to a test applied by federal authorities
under the Bank Merger Act of 1960.15 The question to ask is how firm
is the Pennsylvania legislative intent: is it reflective of a new antitrust
awareness or is it merely lip service to a trend? Illinois, New York,
and Tennessee have in their statutes"' antitrust language which makes
their statutes look seriously pro-competitive.
Although the Pennsylvania legislature has barely spoken, the courts
seem to have some concern for protecting freedom of competition. In
Farmers Bank of Kutztown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Banking'07 the court upheld the approval by the agency of a
bank's application to establish a branch office. One of the points of ap-
parent significance to the court was that the parties had extensively
briefed the antitrust implications of the possibly anticompetitive result
of the establishment of the new branch, and that the agency had
shown its concern for the antitrust implications of the decisions it
would be making."'
Often in such cases, the court is reviewing an agency decision to
permit a new bank or branch to be put into operation. These are not
cases of private plaintiffs complaining of restrictive trade practices
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1604, Comment-Banking Law Commission (Purdon 1967).
105. The Bank Merger Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129. The current ver-
sion of the Act may be found at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828 (1980).
106. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1967, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 161/2, § 71 (Smith-
Hurd 1972), provides: "It is held to be in the public interest that competition prevail in
the banking system and to that end that the independence of unit banks be protected."
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 601-b(1)(fii) (McKinney 1971) provides that before approval or
disapproval of mergers the agency should consider "whether such merger or acquisition
may result in such a lessening of competition as to be injurious to the interests of the
public or tend toward monopoly."
The Tennessee Banking Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-1-102 (1980), provides in relevant
part:
(b) This underlying purpose includes but is not limited to providing for:
(4) The opportunity for banks subject to said chapters to compete
with other businesses including, but not limited to, other financial
organizations....
(c) It is not purpose of chapters one and two of this title to restrict the activities
of banks for the purpose of protecting any person.., from competition from banks
and said chapters do not confer any right or cause of action upon any competitor.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-205 (1980), in listing the factors to be considered in the determina-
tion of whether to grant an application for a charter includes: "(5)(A) The competition of-
fered by existing banks and other financial institutions." See generally Note, Bank
Charter, Branching, Holding Company and Merger Laws: Competition Frustrated, 71
YALE L.J. 502 (1962).
107. 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 454, 333 A.2d 253 (1975).
108. I& at 457-58, 333 A.2d at 255-56.
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such as a uniformity of rates or of other arrangements with regard to
loans, for example. The court as a rule simply reviews the agency deci-
sion under the substantial evidence test and defers to the expertise of
the agency."0 9 Because of this standard of review, and the fact that the
issue of anti-competitive behavior arises only in the merger situation,
it is submitted that it is the legislature's task to instruct the agency
and the courts that regulation for the protection of the public and for
the economic health of the banks is not incompatible with a free enter-
prise policy. There are plenty of practices from which banks should be
barred and on which survival of the banks and protection of the public
do not depend. 10
B. Public Utilities
Much has been written about antitrust policy and public utilities."'
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States"' the court made it clear that
on the federal level regulation does not absolve public utilities from
the duty to comply with the antitrust laws. It has been suggested that
antitrust law "has sufficient sensitivity and flexibility to operate
satisfactorily within the electric utility industry in the appropriate con-
text,""' particularly under the rule of reason rather than the per se
rule. Assuming that there are practices within the industry that are
unnecessarily anti-competitive and that there is room for reconciliation
of the two policies, a survey was made through Pennsylvania's public
utility statutes to find any legislative awareness of or disregard for
such antitrust policy.
The cases under the Public Utility Code tend, again, to refer to the
legislative intent to leave decisions about competition to the sound
discretion of the Public Utility Commission (P.U.C.)."4 And as with the
109. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Pike County v. Department of Banking, 7 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 603, 300 A.2d 823 (1973); Blairsville Nat'l Bank v. Myers, 409 Pa. 526, 187 A.2d 655 (1963).
110. See generally Berle, Banking under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 589
(1949); Cohen, The Antitrust Laws Applied to Bank Mergers, Reciprocity and the Tie-In
Arrangements, 26 Bus. LAW. 1 (1970); Hablutzel, State Regulation of Branch Banking, 16
DuQ. L. REV. 679 (1978); Phillips, Bank Mergers, Branch Banking, and Bank Holding Com-
panies in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 560 (1967).
111. See, e.g., Primeaux, A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure for
Electric Utilities, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS (A. Phillips ed.
1975); Watson & Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated "Monopolies"- the Search for
Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559 (1977).
112. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
113. Shenefield, Antitrust Policy within the Electric Industry, 16 ANTITRUST BULL.
681, 723-24 (1971). The author analyzes the operation of the electrical industry at the
wholesale level with respect to restrictive trade practices such- as market division,
refusals to deal, joint and individual, and joint venture.
114. See, e.g., Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 185 Pa.
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bank cases cited above, there do not seem to be cases where private
plaintiffs are suing other private parties for anti-competitive practices.
An exception to the first statement is seen in a couple of cases involving
motor carriers. In Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission' the court affirmed a grant of rights to
three railroad motor carrier subsidiaries and an enlarging of existing
rights of two independent motor carriers to transport cement. The car-
rier who already had these rights appealed the grant, asserting the er-
ror of the P.U.C. in allowing additional motor carriers. The court said
that it was important to inject an element of competition into the in-
dustry, that the primary consideration of the P.U.C. was to serve the
public interest, that the extent of competition was left to the discre-
tion of the P.U.C., and that the injection of competition sponsored by
consumers would further the public interest and tend to eliminate the
trend towards monopolistic practices." 6 In a case where the Commis-
sion had found monopolization of the motor transport market for ce-
ment in eastern Pennsylvania, however, the court reversed the Com-
mission, saying, "Although the commission does not have jurisdiction
to determine whether a proposed application is in violation of the anti-
trust laws, it may consider the policy of the antitrust laws in determin-
ing the issue of public convenience and necessity and the issue of com-
petition.""'1 Assuming that the laws referred to are the federal laws,
were there an expressed legislative policy to the same effect in Penn-
sylvania, the Commission would have more precise guidance as to the
factors it must consider, such as antitrust considerations, and perhaps
there would be more consistency of result.
C. The Pennsylvania Liquor Code
The twenty-first amendment to the United States Constitution gives
the states substantial control over the sale and distribution of alcoholic
beverages, although Congress also can regulate liquor under the in-
terstate commerce power."8 The United States Supreme Court in
Super. Ct. 588, 138 A.2d 693 (1958); Paradise v. Pennsylvania PUC, 184 Pa. Super. Ct. 8,
132 A.2d 754 (1957); Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 170 Pa. Super. Ct.
411, 85 A.2d 646 (1952).
115. 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 196, 191 A.2d 876 (1963).
116. Md at 209, 191 A.2d at 882. The court cited FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683
(1948) (brought under the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45; a combina-
tion to employ a multiple basing point system of pricing was an unfair trade practice to be
suppressed because it would result in complete destruction of competition and the
establishment of monopoly in the cement industry).
117. Chemical Tank Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 607, 626-27,
165 A.2d 668, 677 (1960), affd, 406 Pa. 359, 178 A.2d 698 (1962).
118. I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 210 (1978).
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California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc."' recently clarified how far the states may go in controlling the li-
quor industry. In this case, California's statutory wine pricing plan,
which allowed for resale price maintenance, was held to be subject to
Sherman Act proscription and not shielded by state action immunity or
the twenty-first amendment. The court said:
[T]here is no bright line between federal and state powers over liquor.
The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure
the liquor distribution system. Although States retain substantial discre-
tion to establish other liquor regulations, those controls may be subject to
the federal commerce power in appropriate situations. The competing
state and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of
those concerns in a "concrete case." 1"
Given this very strong federal interest, the state's policy behind the
pricing system, promoting temperance and protecting small businesses,
was not shown to be furthered by the system, and thus was not a
"substantiated" state concern. For these reasons, the state interest
had to give way to the federal policy favoring competition.
In Pennsylvania, wine and liquor are sold by state-run liquor stores.
Beer is sold, subject to state restriction, by private distributors, and
arguably under the rules that govern the marketplace. Over twenty
years ago the United States brought suit in Pen-qvlvania under the
Sherman Act against local beer distributors for conspiracy to eliminate
competition in the sale of beer to consumers in Erie county."2 ' The
charges involved fixing prices, mark-ups, and delivery charges, and en-
forcing these by boycott. The distributors appealed their convictions
on the theory that the federal government had no jurisdiction because
of the twenty-first amendment, and that trade in beer and malt
beverages had a special status, being regulated under the state's police
powers. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
disagreed:
[T]he Code permits the functioning of a private entrepreneurial system in
the sale and distribution of malt and brewed beverages by the authoriza-
tion of the issuance of licensing to private persons for engaging in the
business of purchasing and distributing such beverages.... No decision of
the Pennsylvania Courts looks in the opposite direction. There is nothing
in the law of Pennsylvania, decisional or otherwise, which authorizes the
fixing of prices, uniform closing hours, save for week-end closings ... or
the enforcement of group action by boycott as charged and proved here.m
119. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
120. Id at 110.
121. United States v. Erie County Malt Beverage Distribs. Ass'n, 264 F.2d 731 (3d Cir.
1959).
122. I& at 733.
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This view is reaffirmed by the California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association case. That case, however, does not answer all questions
that may arise. In V. & L. Cicione, Inc. v. C. Schmiidt & Sons1" action
was brought under the Sherman Act by a beer distributor whose
dealership had been terminated by the brewery. As to the counts of
refusal to deal and monopolization, the court found no case to be made
out. The other count charged territorial restraints and resale price
maintenance. Here, the federal court looked to the Pennsylvania Fair
Trade Act124 which authorized resale price maintenance in certain cir-
cumstances, and then to the Pennsylvania Liquor Code, whose provi-
sions not merely authorized territorial restraints, but actually required
them,"5 and held that the dealer had no cause of action. The subse-
quent repeal of the Fair Trade Act and the California Retail Liquor
Dealers case have definitively resolved the resale price maintenance
issue, but there is a question as to whether the statutory requirement
of vertical territorial restrictions would withstand an attack similar to
that brought against California's resale price maintenance system. In
sum, any state authorized activity, defended as privileged under the
twenty-first amendment or state action immunity, may not withstand
an attack under the Sherman Act if it is otherwise a per se offense. As
to rule of reason offenses, one can only surmise that the Court would
be unlikely to find the state purpose to be of the same stature as the
goals of the Sherman Act, except where the state purpose is both
"legitimate" and "substantiated."1 26
D. Pennsylvania's Milk Marketing Law
The stated legislative purpose of the Milk Marketing Law1 2 is to
regulate all stages of the milk industry for the protection of public
health and welfare and for the prevention of fraud. 2 8 The Milk
Marketing Board, an administrative agency created by the Act, is re-
quired to fix minimum wholesale and retail prices and is empowered to
fix maximum wholesale and retail prices." The legislative intent is em-
phasized as being to protect the industry and to ensure a stable supply
123. 403 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 565 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1977).
124. Fair Trade Act, No. 115, 1935 Pa. Laws 266, as amended by Act of June 12, 1941,
No. 66, 1941 Pa. Laws 266 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 7 (Purdon 1971) (repealed
1976).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-431 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1980).
126. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. at
113-14.
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 700j-101 to -1203 (Purdon 1958 & Supp. 1980).
128. PA. STAT ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-101 (Purdon 1958).
129. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 31, §§ 700j-801 to -803 (Purdon 1958 & Supp. 1980).
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of milk.13° The categories of persons entitled to protection are the pro-
ducers, the transporters, processors and sellers, and the consuming
public."' The objectives of the statute, as seen by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, include "maximum sharing of surplus and equal treat-
ment for all producers," rather than the protection of public health or
the maintenance of sanitary conditions for milk." ,
In other words, the law is an administrative price-fixing statute
making it unlawful to sell milk at prices below the designated price.13
The law is so fundamentally contrary to the spirit of competition that
it includes a section protecting combined activity from being construed as
a conspiracy or combination in restraint of trade.1" It has been ques-
tioned whether the economic judgments incorporated in the statute
have any validity, and whether price-fixing is needed for the farmer to
survive, for the processor to make profits, and for the consumer to be
charged reasonable prices.1 35 Yet a three-judge federal court has con-
cluded that the establishment of minimum resale prices was a per-
missible exercise of the state police power.1 36
The case law is concerned mostly with the power of the legislature
to regulate milk prices. 37 Although the case law upholds the power of
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-801 (Purdon 1958 & Supp. 1980).
131. See City of Pittsburgh v. Milk Marketing Bd., 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. 300, 306-08, 275
A.2d 115, 119-20 (1971), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 902 (1974).
132. Milk Control Comm'n v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 656 & n.4 198 A.2d 840, 842 & n.4,
appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 3 (1964).
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-402 (Purdon Supp. 1980) provides for certain exemp-
tions from the statute.
134. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 707j-404 (5) (Purdon Supp. 1980) provides, inter alia, that
the board may decline to grant a license to an applicant who:
Has been a party to a combination to fix prices contrary to law. A cooperative
agricultural association organized under the laws of this Commonwealth, or a
similar association or corporation organized under the laws of this or any other
state, and engaged in making collective sales or marketing for its members or
shareholders, or any producers' or farmers' union or organization, shall not be
deemed or construed to be a conspiracy or combination in restraint of trade or an
illegal monopoly; nor shall the contracts, agreements, arrangements or combina-
tions heretofore or hereafter made by such association or corporation, or the
members, officers or directors thereof, in making such collective sales and
marketing, and prescribing the terms and conditions thereof, be deemed or con-
strued to be conspiracies or to be injurious to public welfare, trade or commerce ....
135. Note, Government Regulation of Prices: A Study of Milk Control in Penn-
sylvania, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 555 (1961).
136. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Milk Control Comm'n, 335 F. Supp. 1008
(M.D. Pa.), affd, 404 U.S. 930 (1971). Of course, the question now arises as to the effect, if
any, of the California Retail Liquor case, note 119 supra, on this decision.
137. See, e.g., United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Milk Control Comm'n, 335 F.
Supp. at 1014-15; Milk Control Comm'n v. Battista, 413 Pa. at 655-60, 198 A.2d at 841-43;
Milk Control Comm'n v. Louden Hill Farm, Inc., 87 Dauph. County Rep. 254 (1967), affd,
434 Pa. 189, 253 A.2d 630 (1969).
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the legislature to regulate milk prices, there is barely a hint of ap-
proval of the legislature's wisdom in so doing." As expressed in the
statute, the legislature's determination is that competition, instead of
being compatible with regulation, is to be strictly forbidden.
D. Summary
This comment has not exhaustively surveyed Pennsylvania's
regulatory statutes, but it has looked at some of them to see if there is
any legislative directive to take competitive behavior into considera-
tion in the supervision of the regulated industries; to see if there is
any basis in the existing law for competition advocacy in
Pennsylvania's regulated industries. If one assumes that regulation
and competition can co-exist, it would seem, from the absence of free
market language in the above statutes, that the Pennsylvania
legislature is oblivious of it.
III. PENNSYLVANIA'S UNFAIR TRADE STATUTES
Although the Fair Trade Act 139 was repealed in 1976, it seems
necessary to discuss it briefly. It was in existence for some forty years
138. See City of Pittsburgh v. Milk Marketing Bd., where the Commonwealth Court
stated: "It is not within the purview of this Court to make the decision on whether or not
there should be any regulation of the dairy industry. Only the Legislature can do that,
and it has consistently been the sense of that deliberative body to continue the
regulation." 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 308, 275 A.2d at 120. See also Milk Control Comm'n v.
Louden Hill Farm, Inc. 87 Dauph. County Rep. 254 (1967), affd, 434 Pa. 189, 253 A.2d 630
(1969).
139. Section 7 of the Act provided:
No contract relating to the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the
label or content of which bears, or the vending equipment from which said com-
modity is sold to the consumer bears the trademark, brand or the name of the pro-
ducer or owner of such commodity, and which is in fair and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced by others, shall be deemed in viola-
tion of any law of the State of Pennsylvania by reason of any of the following provi-
sions which may be contained in such contract:
(a) That the buyer will not resell such commodity, except at the price stipulated
by the vendor.
(b) That the buyer of such commodity require upon his resale of such commodity
that the purchaser from him agree that such purchaser will not in turn resell ex-
cept at the price stipulated by the vendor of the buyer.
Such provisions in any contract shall be deemed to contain or imply conditions
that such commodities may be resold without reference to such agreement in the
following cases:
(a) In closing out the owner's stock for the purpose of discontinuing delivering
any such commodity.
(b) When the goods are damaged or deteriorated in quality, or removed from the
fair trade price schedule of the producer or owner of the trademark, brand or
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and thus many cases dealing with vertical price fixing were dismissed
because the activity in question was protected by this law." The Act
essentially provided that manufacturers by contract with their
retailers could set the price at which their product was sold, provided
it was a name brand product and was in fair and open competition with
similar products. The purpose was ostensibly to protect the manufac-
turers and sellers and the owners of a trade mark from predatory
price cutting, and from the use of loss leaders, and to protect the good
will toward the product."' For a while even non-signatories to those
contracts were bound by them."' But in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.
v. White Cross Stores, Inc.,"' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
the Act unconstitutional as applied to non-signers of the resale price
maintenance contracts.
Throughout the life of the Fair Trade Act, commentators"' and
judges often criticized it, the courts enforcing it with notable ill
grace" (or not enforcing it where they could avoid enforcement)." 6 The
name, and notice is given the public thereof.
(c) By any officer acting under orders of any court or in the execution of any writ
or distress.
For a reaction to the repeal of the fair trade laws in general, see Givens, Mass Repeal of
Fair Trade: Beginning of the End for Resale Price Maintenance? 1975-76 ANTITRUST SYM-
POSIUM 4, written after the repeal in 1974 of the Miller-Tydings Act provisos to the Sher-
man Act and the 1975 repeal of the McGuire Act.
140. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Master, 408 Pa. 202, 182 A.2d 734 (1962); Lentheric, Inc.
v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 338 Pa. 533, 13 A.2d 406 (1940).
141. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Schwartz, 398 Pa. 60, 63, 157 A.2d 63, 64 (1959); Norman
M. Morris Corp. v. Hess Bros., 243 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1957).
142. Burche Co. v. General Elec. Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1955).
143. 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964) (overruling Burche).
144. See, e.g., Schactman, Resale Price Maintenance and the Fair Trade Laws, 11 U.
PITT. L. RaV. 562 (1950) (although these laws are a weapon against price-cutting and thus
a protection for the small retailer, they are inconsistent with antitrust policy in that they
permit monopolistic practices; the author analyzes the effect and abuses of resale price
maintenance and urges a reexamination of the fair trade laws); Note, Monopolistic Com-
petition and the Fair Trade Acts, 14 TEMPLE L.Q. 95 (1939).
145. Mead Johnson & Co. v. Martin Wholesale Distr., Inc., 408 Pa. 12, 15, 182 A.2d
741, 743 (1962), where Justice Musmanno stated:
The theory behind Fair Trade legislation is that when a meritorious product ac-
quires a certain good standing with the public, it is necessary to uphold its stan-
dard by prohibiting its sale at prices which presumably would be below or close to
the cost price. If one dealer cuts prices below or close to the cost price, another
dealer may cut even lower. This, then, could be followed by still further lower cut-
ting until the slashing would fall below the water line, sinking completely the ship
of good trade. Whether this line of reasoning comports with good economics, good
logic and the kind of rivalry which generally is upheld in our private enterprise
system is, we repeat, not for this Court to pass upon.
146. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Schwartz, 398 Pa. 60, 157 A.2d 63 (1959) (denying an in-
junction to restrain a dealer from selling gasoline below the set price because the oil com-
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Act was repealed in 1975,'147 but one should not infer from that an in-
dependent legislative policy in favor of competition, as repeal appears
to have been prompted by the repeal of the federal fair trade laws.
One should also consider the Unfair Sales Act.14 Originally called
the Fair Sales Act,1 9 it was held unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in that it prohibited all sales below cost.150 The court
implied that it would be valid if restricted to sales below cost made
with intent to destroy competition. 5' As a result, the statute was
amended to include the element of intent. 52 The statute is apparently
designed to prevent predatory price cutting.
The Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law'5' is
basically an anti-fraud statute for the protection of the consumer. It is
modeled on the Federal Trade Commission Act.54 It prohibits such
practices as passing off, misleading advertising, disparagement, bait
and switch, chain letters, and breach of warranty. An amendment
enacted in 19781's provides for private actions and the award of actual
damages and treble damages.
The Gasoline, Petroleum Products and Motor Vehicle Accessories
Act'" regulates the practices of suppliers, distributors, and dealers of
those products for the purpose, inter alia, of fostering vigorous com-
petition and promoting public safety. The Unfair Cigarette Sales Act 7
forbids the sales at less than cost with intent to destroy or substantial-
ly lessen competition. This latter statute together with the Unfair
Sales Act provides for a presumption of unlawful intent from proof of
sale or offer to sell below cost. It has been suggested that this
presumption may mean that the law is still defective."8 It has yet to be
challenged in court, however. Perhaps a legislative direction in the
form of a state antitrust statute would encourage and enable the bring-
pany had not presented enough evidence to support its contention that its gasoline was in
fair and open competition with other brands).
147. See note 139 supra.
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 211-217 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1980).
149. No. 533, 1937 Pa. Laws 2672.
150. Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 137 Pa. Super. Ct. 96, 8 A.2d 801 (1939), affd, 338 Pa.
457, 13 A.2d 67 (1940).
151. Id. at 100, 8 A.2d at 804.
152. Act of August 11, 1941, No. 344, 1941 Pa. Laws 900.
153. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1980).
154. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
155. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2 (Supp. 1980).
156. Id. § 202.
157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 231.1 - .6 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1980).
158. Hawkland, The Pennsylvania Unfair Sales and Unfair Cigarette Sales Laws, in
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 at 1 (1971).
Vol119:731
Pennsylvania Antitrust Law
ing of suits to challenge anti-competitive conduct that dealers current-
ly may engage in under the umbrella of protectionist statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The pattern of trade regulation in Pennsylvania is frustratingly,
sometimes bewilderingly, random. Because there is no one clear
legislative enunciation of the Commonwealth's policy on competition,
businessmen and lawyers must guess at what is proscribed and what is
encouraged. The courts are given scant basis upon which to resolve
disputes which, if brought in federal court under federal antitrust
statutes, could be adjudicated quickly. Other states have been active in
antitrust enforcement and, although it is beyond the scope of this com-
ment to discuss their experience, California, New York, and
Maryland1 provide examples which the Pennsylvania legislature
might follow. The Commonwealth's law makers might also find inspira-
tion in this recent declaration of the United States Supreme Court:
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor of com-
petition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular,
are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to
the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise
system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms." 1w
Stephanie G. Spaulding
159. See Note, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement. The Problems with Putting
New Wine in Old Wine Skins, 4 J. CORP. L. 547, 609 (1979).
160. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
110-11 (1980) (quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)). The Court
went on to state:
Although this federal interest is expressed through a statute rather than a con-
stitutional provision, Congress "exercis[ed] all the power it possessed" under the
Commerce Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers
v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's pro-
competition policy.
Id. at 111.
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